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Abstract 
As a policy science, economics unfortunately suffers from endless 
controversies. These controversies originate from the difficulty of testing economic 
theory. Conventional methodology (like Friedman's) does not help so much in this 
respect. Various technical as well as methodological problems weaken the foundation 
of testing. Empirical works on the Ricardian Equivalence is used as an illustration of 




There is a famous joke about economics and economists: if you put all 
economists of the world around a table, they will never reach any conclusion. As 
"scientists", economists can influence policy-making. They may be appointed to 
important positions in policy making bodies. ^  However，for the same phenomenon, 
different economists offer us different explanations, and there is no agreement among 
them on the possible effects of the policies they recommend. Having no idea of which 
economic hypothesis is right, one is unable to know the merit of any policy proposals. 
Implementing any policy without knowing its effect is unhealthy, if not dangerous. It 
will be interesting to ask whether it is possible for us to choose among competing 
theories on the basis of some rational criteria. 
Policy controversy in macroeconomics is closely related to the problem of 
theory choice. Since policy proposals are derivatives from predictions of economic 
theories, it is only reasonable to check them in the natural setting: to see their effect in 
actual practice. If the usual conception of science is right, this approach (by appealing 
to empirical evidence) will facilitate our decision on competing theories. Since different 
theories lead to different policy proposals and conflicting predictions, asking which 
proposal is usefol entails asking which theory's prediction is right, or which one stands 
the test of empirical evidence. 
1 For example, Alan Blinder^^^^Keynesian” economist at Princeton, was appointed a very high position in 
the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. in Apnl, 1994. 
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The field of macroeconomics is especially pertinent. Different schools of 
thought have different perspectives in how the economy operates, and consequently 
they have quite different views on matters of macroeconomic management. They build 
different models and recommend different stabilization policies. Various theories have 
been advanced, and to support their theories and arguments, economists usually resort 
to empirical testing. Take the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis for instance which will 
be examined in a later chapter as the case study of this thesis. Ricardian Equivalence is 
about the effect of government budget deficit on the behavior of the economy. Under 
certain assumptions, the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis asserts that government 
budget deficit will have no effect on the aggregate consumption behavior. However, if 
any one of these assumptions does not hold, the equivalence result will break down. 
Taken literally, it is highly probable that none of the assumptions will hold. In 
particular, the assumption of immortal economic agents is untenable, as we all know 
(or have the expectation) that we will die one day. Another assumption which will 
probably not hold in reality is the efficient capital market. Any constraint in the credit 
market will render economic agents unable to smooth out flexibly the effect of 
government budget deficit on their consumption plans. 
This hypothesis (Ricardian Equivalence) is related to the school of thought 
called the ‘TSTew Classical" macroeconomics, which is characterized by its embrace of 
the instantaneous market clearing assumption. On the other hand，the "New 
Keynesian" theory rejects this assumption. We can think of these two schools of 
thought as "general theories" regarding the operation of the macroeconomy. Today， 
these two schools are the major participants occupying the central stage in 
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macroeconomics. Between these two schools, there is much controversy, with the 
Ricardian Equivalence as a heated point of contest. Inasmuch as the assumptions 
underlying the Ricardian Equivalence are common in New Classical theories, testing 
this particular hypothesis (of the "Ricardian Equivalence") also amounts to examining 
the basic assumptions of the above two schools in contention, and their relevant policy 
recommendation as well. 
The conventional wisdom in economics is that we are to make the choice of 
theories by comparing their predictions with empirical evidence (Friedman, 1953). The 
role of prediction is very important in this respect. Only when competing theories all 
stand the test of empirical evidence should other criteria be adopted. However, 
although empirical work on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence is immense, the 
results cannot be easily interpreted. Complicated technical issues in the process of 
testing are also involved，and it is very difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion. Is this 
a technical matter or a methodological matter? If it is the former, then, improved 
testing techniques can lead us somewhere. But if it is the latter, then, the foundation of 
testing - logical empiricism - is at stake. The role of prediction is not clear. 
The theme of this thesis will evolve around the role of prediction in validating 
economic theories and its related methodological problems. Can theory choice be 
based on testing of predictions? If not, what are the problems and difficulties? The case 
of macroeconomics will be examined, and a study on the testing of a particular 
hypothesis, the Ricardian Equivalence, will be used as an illustration. It is hope that 
our understanding on the role of prediction and its relationship to theory choice in 
economics can be furthered. 
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Part I What is Prediction? 
Explanation and prediction are two important facets of scientific inquiry.2 If we 
are able to explain a phenomenon, we will also be able to predict the phenomena of the 
same kind. The only difference lies in the time dimension. Explanation deals with what 
has already happened, while prediction deals with what is going to happen. The 
discussion which follows in this thesis will draw heavily on the "covering-law model" 
of scientific explanation (Hospers, 1956; Hempel, 1966). The choice of this particular 
model lies in its simplicity and usefulness. In particular, it helps to illustrate a series of 
problems which are relevant to the discussion in this essay. Following a brief summary 
of the covering-law model, we will discuss the nature of general law, which is an 
important ingredient of a covering-law explanation. Then there will be a discussion on 
the logic of validation^ which is a field of controversies. The ideas which are of 
particular interest to economists will be emphasized. The purpose of these discussions 
is to illustrate the role of prediction in economics. Particularly, if comparison of 
predictions to reality is not sufficient for judging the relative merits of theories, what 
then is the use of it? What is the problem with the use of this test? These are the prime 
problems which are going to be addressed in this essay. 
Friedman (1953). In 讓已⑵；^  J ^ � s ^ f ^ k f 彻 c t i o r T ^ l a n a t a ’ ， i s in essence the same as 
- 二 二 ： 二 二 二 〜 ( 1 輝。—^^^ 
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1.1 structure of Scientific Explanation: Covering-Law Model 
Although different authors use different names，the essence of the model is the 
same.3 In covering-law model，an explanation, however complex it is, consists of (1) 
statements on hypotheses (the covering laws), and (2) statements about particular 
circumstances (or, put it another way, the initial and marginal conditions). From both 
types of statements, explanation is deductively obtained. Schematically, the model can 
be represented as follows: 
A ,丄2 , , A" 
,Ck 
E 
where Z/s and C's constitute the "explanans sentence", in which the Z/s are general 
laws (also referred to as covering laws) and the C's are assertions about particular 
facts. E is the explanadum sentence. It is the phenomenon which has to be explained. 
This means that E follows deductively from the L，s together with the C's by virtue of 
the rules of logic. Z/s，the general laws or covering laws, connect the particular facts, 
C’s, to the phenomenon，R It is obvious that the role of the laws is very important for 
the derivation of conclusion, E. Given the laws or hypotheses in the major premises, 
the conclusion logically follows, given the conditions specified in the minor premises. 
A brief discussion on the nature of general laws is then necessary. In fact, this is where 
the role of scientific theory should be considered. 
3 F o r e x a m p l e ， t h e model as the "deductive-nomological" model, 一 in Hayek 
(1967) it is refeired to as the "hypothetical deductive model. 
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At the most primitive level, general laws might just be a hunch. At a higher 
level, they might be the product of a highly sophisticated deductive system. Some 
authors argue that there lies at least one general law behind every real scientific 
explanation.^ In effect, a large part of economic theory uses such a system. From the 
theory, a hypothesis is derived. Putting it together with the initial and marginal 
conditions，an explanation of the phenomena in question is obtained. If the explanation 
refers to something not yet happened, it is a prediction from the theory (see, for 
example, Hempel, 1966). 
A classic example in economics, perhaps, is the law of demand. It states that， 
ceteris paribus, an increase in price will lead to a decrease in quantity demanded.^ In 
the most modem version of microeconomic theory, it is derived from a set of axioms 
on the preference of consumer together with a set of regularity conditions (Kreps, 
1990； Varian, 1992).^ In any case, the law of demand is a conclusion with empirical 
content: it is an assertion about the real world. Together with the statement of a 
specific condition, say “ceteris paribus’ the price of gasoline will increase at midnight 
of 26/5/94”，the prediction "quantity demanded for gasoline will decrease after 
midnight of that day" can thus be obtained.， 
4 For example Camap (1966) cited an hypothetical example: 'If you ask a physicist ‘Why is it that，s iron rod, 
i S i = : � ; f i U exactly mto ^ apparatus, is n o w a t n f l e too long to fit?’,，may r ， y b y - y m g： 
TO y rwere 7nt of the room, I heated the rod." He assmnes, of course, Aat you know t^ law of ^ 
‘ 6 = 二 二 s e in order to be understood, he would have added,' and, v^heneve^  a body is heated, it 
" d ? I ^ S S law is essential to his explanation." (p.8) It seems he presumes that —never there is an 
explanation, there is a law behind _ , 
5 This is a rather strong version. A weaker version can be obtained by saying that "m^ease m pnce Mall notlead 
t o = = = q = ， c i e m a n d e d ， , . It is necessaxy to consider the price elasticity of demand to de tenmne ^ ^ c h 
l ^ o ^ o t o venations is relevant But this is beyond the scope of present discussion. 
6 Tt that the most important accomplishment of modem economics in the past five decades is that mo^ of 
the = = = ， = : stated ahundredyears ago are successfuUy put into mathemaUcal tools. In other 
^ r o W conclusions are restated in new, more technical mathematical language. : 
7 , ，，‘ 1 _ … ” viootidties" etc are all theoretical constructs which bear no empincai 
^ ^ . e r i e = & ^ s 續 on these c o n s t a t s ,咖 ^ t e s t e d , . 
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1.2 Prediction and Theory choice 
In many cases，we can have many different theories which can account for the 
same phenomenon. When we ask 'Svhich theory is best”，we are confronting the 
problem of making a decision among the competing theories. However, the motive to 
make this choice is hard to articulate. Some authors are only concerned with the 
practical value of a theory. For instance, some authors, the instrumentalists，believe 
that scientific theories are tools for making predictions. For them, a good theory is one 
which accounts for more diverse kinds of phenomena and is able to make accurate 
predictions (Friedman, 1953; Boland, 1979). Some，the realists，believe that the 
theoretical constructs (e.g. demand curve and supply curve) are referring to something 
real. The search for a better theory is to find out what is real about the world (e.g. 
Klemke, Hollinger and Kline, 1980 quoting Eddington). The nature of theoretical 
construct is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, whether one is a realist or an 
instrumentalist, theory choice is an important issue. 
In light of the covering-law model, the problem of theory choice is solved by 
means ofmodus tollens: JfA, then 足 but not-5, therefore not-A If the prediction of a 
theory is in accordance with the empirical evidence, it will be accepted. Note that it 
does not necessarily mean that the theory is proved to be true. However, if the 
prediction contradicts empirical evidence, it 呵 well be proved false. In the language 
of logic, a right conclusion can foUow from w r o n g premises; but a wrong conclusion 
can only be derived from wrong premises. THus, to assert that a hypothesis is true 
Z L the quantity being transacted at the market pnce. 
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because the empirical evidence does not contradict the prediction, one is committing 
the fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
The example of the law of demand in the last section can serve to illustrate the 
ideas presented above. If quantity demanded did drop after a price rise，there would be 
no problem，although this does not necessarily mean the theory from which the 
hypothesis (law of demand) was derived is true. However, if quantity demanded 
increased, the law of demand might well be refuted (at least logically it is proved 
wrong). Basically it means that a hypothesis can be denied, but not confirmed. 
What if there are several hypotheses which all pass empirical testing? In this 
case, other criteria may be needed. Falsifiability, Occam's razor, and realistic 
assumptions are all criteria put forth for theory choice, beyond the basic rule contained 
in modus tollens. In any case, the role of prediction is very important for modus 
tollens. Although one cannot verify a theory (because of the problem of induction), 
one can nevertheless falsify it if its prediction is contradictory to empirical evidence. 
1,3 Prediction and Economic Methodoiogy 
The study of methodology concerns with the logic of validation (Rudner， 
1966). However, the study of methodoiogy of economics does not confine to the logic 
of validation only. Theory choice occupies a very large part of the literature (Caldwell， 
1993). We have examined an elementary case of theory choice and validation. But the 
example is，at best, elementary. In fact，\f modus tollens is enough for theory choice， 
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there will not be that much controversies in economics. On the contrary, we have a 
large bodies of mutually incompatible theories which are claimed to have stood the test 
of empirical evidence. Before going to the case of macroeconomics, the major 
methodological thoughts influential in economics will now be reviewed. It is interesting 
to see what economists (claim to) believe before finding out what they are actually 
doing and whether they have gone astray. 
1.4 Conventional Wisdom 
1.41 Friedman's Methodology 
Modem methodological discourse in economics began from an essay by Milton 
Friedman (Friedman, 1953).8 According to Friedman, the function of an economic 
theory is like the function of a filing system. It helps us to classify and organize 
phenomena so that we are able to explain them by means of similar schemata. In this 
perspective, the value of an economic theory is derived from its usefulness. We are 
supposed to consider the usefulness of a filing system in performing its functions in 
classification and organization. 
Accordingly, we should not ask the question "Is the theory realistic?" because 
this is not the primary function of an economic theory as a filing system. We should 
only ask about its convenience. While choosing among alternative theories (or filing 
(Hayek，1952). 二二。二二 ^ ^ e T e X t h o s e — embrace the pos.tiv.st position and, at the 
二二 ^ ^ S T w h o d ^ s a g r e e 碰 it(see,fore麗ple，McCloskey，1983; 1983). 
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systems), the most important criterion is whether the predictions implied by the theory 
are in accordance with the empirical evidence. The more times a theory passes the test 
of evidence, the better the theory. It is also important that the theory is general 
enough, so that it can account for more phenomena, and will be preferred to other 
theories which account for less phenomena. In this respect, Friedman teaches us not to 
worry about the realism of a theory, particularly its assumption. Taking the meaning of 
"theory" literally, it is necessarily false, since all the details of the real world are not 
encompassed by any given theory, and it is impossible to do so. Rather, a theory 
enables us to eliminate all the irrelevant details of the phenomena being explained. It is 
an abstraction of the real world. 
If competing theories all stand the test of empirical evidence, the choice among 
them might appeal to other criteria apart from "accuracy" of predictions. For example, 
parsimony, or simplicity，of a theory might be counted. And the "general-ness" of a 
theory mentioned above can also be considered. Probably，Friedman would not 
disagree that realism of assumption will play a role here. However，it should never be 
the first consideration in the choice of theory. 
In summary, by successive empirical testing，Friedman believes that we can 
ultimately arrive at some hypotheses that are in well accordance with empirical 
evidence. In this way we can have some useful theories. However，Friedman never 
talks about the problem of "truth". This position has earned Friedman a place among 
the "instrumentalists”，a position which asserts that theories "are merely tools for 
making inferences, or for organizing our observations，in and of themselves，they have 
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no truth" (Mayer, 1993, p.220). Certainly, we can have theories about the real world 
which correlate well with empirical evidence, but we can never know how the real 
world is. 
1.42 The Impact of Popper 
Another influential figure for methodological thinking in economics is Karl 
Popper. In fact his influence was felt at the time when Terrence Hutchison wrote his 
classic on economic methodology (Hutchison, 1960). And some economists are indeed 
very enthusiastic in preaching Popperian methodology to economists in the present day 
(e.g. Blaug, 1980，1992). 
"Falsifiability" might be a very familiar word for scientists. However, this word 
is far from a complete summary of Popper's view on knowledge and scientific 
methodology. Only the thesis of falsifiability and its relationship with the methodology 
of economics will be reviewed here. Originally as a criterion of demarcation between 
"science" and "non-science" or "pseudo-science，” falsifiability was interpreted as being 
the criterion for validating a theory. In its original form, falsifiability is what 
distinguishes scientific from non-scientific theory，in that scientific theory can 
conceivably be falsified. This is in contrast with the notion of verification because a 
theory can never be verified. Due to the problem of induction, one can never ascertain 
a theory by finding confirming instances, because we never know what will happen in 
the future. However, one single disconfirming piece of evidence is enough to reject a 
theory. Popper asserts that a scientific theory should conceivably be able to be falsified, 
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not verified. And what scientists should do is not to try to verify their theories but 
instead to falsify them. In this respect. Popper tells us that we can never have certain 
knowledge, in the sense that we can never know which theory is true. However, by 
means of falsification, we can probably approach the Truth, albeit we probably can 
never reach it. This implies that all the scientific knowledge we have is tentative. It 
might be in the future falsified and replaced by better theories. 
From this respect, the criterion for the choice of scientific theory is deduced. A 
(falsifiable) theory that fails to be falsified for many times is said to be well 
corroborated and we can tentatively accept it. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a 
theory that is falsified should be discarded and not to be considered again. This 
depends on the particular problem in hand. For example, Newtonian mechanics have 
been shown to be less well performed than Einstein's theory of relativity. But it is still 
taught today because under many circumstances, particularly when the speed of the 
object considered is slow compared to that of light，Newtonian mechanics is a very 
good approximation. 
Critics have argued that falsification is almost impossible to put into practice. 
In particular, hypotheses are never tested in isolation. Rather, it is tested as a whole 
with auxiliary hypotheses. The famous Duhem-Quine thesis is addressed to this 
problem. Exactly the same problem is confronting the methodology proposed by 
Friedman. Since a theory is usually tested in conjunction with some auxiliary 
hypotheses, it is hard to tell, when a theory is falsified, where the problem is. Friedman 
15 
proposes that when this case happens, other criteria should be used in appraising 
theories. 
This is very discouraging. A review on the controversy above shows that the 
issue is not about which school of thought is right or wrong, but about which 
particular hypothesis addressing to which particular problem is right. However, within 
a school of thought, hypotheses are always interwined and exceedingly difficult to 
disentangle. In macroeconomics, the policy recommendations on economic 
stabilization depend very much on how the formation of business cycles is perceived. 
To answer the question "which kind of policy is more appropriate", we need to provide 
an answer to the operation of the economy. It would be great if there is a straight 
answer in form of a simple theory. But unfortunately the theories advanced so far are 
all composite theories, so that testing can only be done indirectly at best. 
1,5 Unconventional Wisdom 
1.51 Kuhn and Lakatos 
In his well-known The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962)，Kuhn 
proposed a very different approach to the philosophy of science. He puts more 
emphasis on the sociological factors in the course of the history of science. In Kuhn's 
terminology, a community of scientists is engaging in "normal science" when there 
exists a body of theories which is widely accepted by this community. At this stage of 
normal science, all the facts and obsei^ations that contradict the dominant theory， 
called "anomalies", are put aside. Only those hypotheses at the peripheral of the 
dominant body of theories will be changed in order to cope with the anomalies so as to 
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retain the "paradigm". However, as anomalies accumulate and more and more of them 
are unable to be explained by correcting the peripheral hypotheses, a "scientific 
revolution" would result. Some other theories which are more successful in accounting 
for the anomalies will replace the original "paradigm", and gain wide acceptance in the 
scientific profession. Kuhn calls this a "paradigm shift". 
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs ofLakatos has more or less 
the same flavor of that of Kuhn's. Actually, it is a fusion of Popperian falsificationism 
and Kuhnian scientific revolution, Lakatos sees the practice of science as an activity 
of appraising a series of theories, instead of a single theory. That is, all the theories 
which prevail at a time, called a "scientific research program", are appraised together. 
Several few theories constitute the "hard core" of the program, while other peripheral 
theories form the "protective belt". Instead of directed towards the "hard core", 
falsification is usually directed towards the "protective belt". Thus, "hard core" is 
hardly touched. 
This line of inquiry does not provide us with any explicit prescription on 
methodology. Rather, the point is that, given the difficulties in practicing the 
methodology mentioned above，sometimes fashion will dominate. But fashion itself will 
change over time. Then, the role of prediction and testing will be very different from 
what Friedman and Popper have taught us. 
1.52 Feyerabend the Anarchist 
The prescription of Feyerabend in methodology is no methodology. In his 
controversial book Against Method (1991)，he argued against the ”rationalist 
reconstruction" of the Copernicus revolution. He emphasized personal influence as 
9 Lakatos call his ver s ion '^ f»a t ion as "sophisticated falsification", while the version of Popper 
"naive falsification". 
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well as accidental factors in the course of events in the so called "Copernicus 
revolution". The way the historian of science documented these events created an 
impression that some particular mode of "doing things" will lead to success. But this 
particular mode in fact does not exist, he argued. And the only way to scientific 
progress is: anything goes. 
In economics, we have McCloskey the anarchist. Though the emphasis of his 
writing on methodology is different from that of Feyerabend, he has reached similar 
conclusion. McCloskey argue that methodology is none but a kind of "rhetorical 
device" used by economists. And economic methodology, particularly as prescribed by 
Friedman and Popperian, is actually not followed, and in fact should not be followed, 
by economists. He then proceed to advocate that no methodological prescription is the 
best prescription. 
The perspective of Feyerabend and McCloskey is very interesting and 
provocative. It has stirred up debate in the profession, especially among those 
economists who specialize in methodology. For present discussion, what Feyerabend 
and McCloskey have contributed is that, recognizing that scientists are also human, the 
practice of science should allow for more degree of freedom. Tight Methodological 
rules (with capital letter ”M", as McCloskey put it) should not be set. Otherwise the 
progress of the subject will be retarded. 
1,6 Conclusion for Part I 
Friedman's essay has been very influential in the past forty years. Whenever 
economists are criticized as making unrealistic assumptions, they will put forward 
Friedman's argument as their shield. Friedman and Popper put a lot emphasis on the 
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importance of the parallel between theoretical and empirical evidence. What is implied 
by this position is that economic theory is testable. 
On the contrary, Kuhn, Feyerabend and McCloskey are not concerned too 
much with the testability of theory. While Kuhn emphasizes the influence of 
sociological factors, McCloskey puts his emphasis on the rhetorical aspect of economic 
theory. All of them do not address the problem of testability, though it does not mean 
that they do not think testability is important. Instead，they think that science is more 
than mechanical activities of deriving and testing hypotheses. According to 
McCloskey, economists are telling stories; they try to persuade others. In this light, the 
role of prediction is secondary. 
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Part II Macroeconomic Controversy 
As a policy science, macroeconomics has unfortunately suffered from endless 
debates. Before the 1960s，there was a time when consensus prevailed but after that it 
broke down (Mankiw, 1988，1990 ； Klamer, 1984). Regardless of many theoretical 
innovations, there seems to be no major consensus on how the macroeconomy 
operates and on the role of stabilization policy. On the one hand, Keynesian economics 
continues to endorse the government with the power to "fine tune" the economy. On 
the other hand. New Classical macroeconomics denies the effectiveness of policies and 
believes interference of the government will only make things worse. But empirical 
evidence is unable to give us any clear guidance on who is right and who is wrong. 
2.1 Lucas，Critique, the New Classical and the New Keynesian 
Lucas (1976) argued that the prevailing large-scale macroeconometric model 
(in the day he wrote the essay) was useless for the purpose of policy evaluation. 
Although he claimed that he didn't originate this idea, credit was given to him, and this 
argument is called the ”Lucas, critique". The reason is that agents in the economy will 
adjust their behavior when there is any policy change, since policy parameters enter 
into their optimization problem. As a result, the "deep structural parameters" which are 
supposed to be estimated in the econometric model will change. Consequently，policy 
evaluation based on the forecast from these models will fail. It can be said that the 
relationships as estimated by the econometric model are variant, rather than invariant. 
To be useful, the model should estimate relationships which are invariant. This insight 
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has stimulated researches in search of microfoundations for macro economic theory. By 
doing so，it is hoped that the invariant relationships can be found which are free from 
the Lucas' critique. 
Another theoretical innovation in macroeconomics is the rational expectations 
hypothesis, put forward by John Muth in 1962. When combined with other theoretical 
notions such as instantaneous market clearing, a new school of thought on 
macroeconomics has emerged: New Classical macroeconomics. There are several 
important notions put forward by the advocates of this school: the impossibility of 
macroeconomic stabilization and the ineffectiveness of macroeconomic policies. They 
are important because, if the New Classicals are right，we may have another revolution 
in the way we perceive human society. 
Traditional Keynesian economics has long been criticized as lacking 
microfoundation, because the relationships among the aggregate variables in it are not 
derived from individual optimizing behavior. Econometric models based on Keynesian 
theory are therefore susceptible to Lucas' critique. Nevertheless, long before the 
Lucas, critique was noticed，theoretical developments in providing microfoundations 
for the Keynesian theory was on its way. Friedman's and ModigHani's work on 
aggregate consumption function are such examples. "Neoclassical synthesis" is the 
, label given to this trend of theoretical development. 
The research agenda of the New Keynesians is to search for the 
microfoundations of real as well as nominal rigidity. For instance，long term labor 
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contract is the cause of rigidity in the labor market; small menu cost and monopolistic 
competition are the sources of rigidity in the product market. These attempts are aimed 
at justifying the traditional Keynesian theory on the notion of market failure, which is 
the basis of government intervention. 
In the following, three aspects of the debates between the New Classicals and 
New Keynesians will be briefly considered: the role of stabilization policy and the 
effectiveness of monetary as well as fiscal policy in affecting aggregate demand. 
2.2 The Role of Stabilization Policy 
The role of stabilization policy as perceived by economists is related to their 
view of what causes business cycles. While the New Classicals deny the possibility of 
successful "fine tuning". New Keynesians still uphold their belief on the role of 
stabilization policy. This conflicting opinions is the result of different perception on the 
formation of business cycles. 
Real business cycle falls in the tenet of the New Classical school for its 
adherence to individual optimizing behavior and market clearing (see Plosser, 1989). 
Economic fluctuation is viewed as the result of technological shock. The structure of 
real business cycle models are very simple and elegant. Focusing on the behavior of 
those time series which are relevant to business cycles, this kind of models abstract 
from monetary influence. Starting from individual preference and the production 
fianction of representative agents, predictions on the behavior of those time series are 
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derived. Adding technological shock to the model, business cycles can be generated. 
The simulated series based on the model is surprisingly similar to the postwar series of 
the American economy. 
Since this class of models is based on the notion of individual optimizing 
behavior, economic fluctuation is not viewed as something harmful, something that 
should be combated. Rather, fluctuation in output is the optimal response of the agents 
facing uncertainty and technological shock. In this sense, the role of stabilizing policy 
is dubious. It might do more harm than good. 
The New Keynesians reject these propositions. Basically, they presuppose the 
existence of market failure, either in the form of real rigidities or nominal rigidities or 
both in the economy (Gordon, 1990). When there is shock in the economy, the 
response of the agents might well be suboptimal due to their inability to adjust to the 
change. Surely there is room for beneficial stabilization policy. 
Methodologically speaking, it is not easy to differentiate these conflicting ideas 
on the formation of business cycles. The notion of market failure, which differentiates 
the New Keynesians from the New Classicals, is not empirical. To say that a market is 
efficient means that the new information will instantaneously show up in the price. On 
the empirical level，we do not know whether there is new information unless we see 
the price movement. On the other hand, the information is usually subjective，in the 
sense that it is people's belief on the state of the market. As long as we do not know 
what people believe, it is not possible to argue empirically whether market is efficient. 
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On the theoretical level, the role of stabilization policy leads directly to the 
debate on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. And the debate highlights the 
conflict between the New Classicals and the New Keynesians as well as the 
methodological problems involved in validating economic theories. 
2.3 Effectiveness of Monetary Policy 
The general idea of the "policy ineffective” hypothesis is that, if agents in the 
economy can correctly anticipate the effect of monetary policy (one form of rational 
expectations), they will adjust their behavior accordingly and render the policy 
ineffective in systematically affecting real output (Hoover, 1984). The rationale behind 
this is that，since the policy is announced before implementation, if people are rational 
enough, they will correctly anticipate that the monetary policy will only affect the price 
level but not the real wage. As the situation in the labor market remains the same，real 
output is not affected. 
This result can be seen as an extension of the theory of Friedman and Phelps on 
the long run Philips curve. The difference lies in the fact that, while Friedman and 
Phelps believe there is no long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation but 
nevertheless there can be a short-run trade-off;. But authors on "policy ineffectiveness” 
deny the possibility of short-run tradeoff altogether (Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Only 
policy not announced in advance can be expected to have effect on real output. 
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The New Keynesians reject the proposition of "policy ineffectiveness” They do 
not make the assumption of market clearing, which differentiates them from the New 
Classicals. In fact, rational expectations alone cannot yield policy irrelevant results. 
Adhering to the notion of market disequilibrium (due to the presence of real and 
nominal rigidities), the New Keynesians believe that monetary policy is in no way 
ineffective. Real output will still be affected by monetary policy as long as agents are 
unable to adjust flexibly because of rigidities in the economy. 
2.4 Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy 
Standard Keynesian analysis implies that fiscal policy can affect aggregate 
output, and the extreme case of crowding out is just not possible in Keynesians 
perception. On the other hand，the New Classicals cast doubt on the validity of 
Keynesian analysis. In Keynesian analysis, the effect of fiscal policy is from 
government spending and taxation policy. The effect of government spending is from 
its influence on the aggregate demand function, and the effect of taxation is from its 
influence on disposable income, which in turn affect consumption demand and thus 
aggregate demand. 
On the other hand, for the New Classicals, the effect of government spending is 
from the substitutabiHty between government provided and privately provided goods 
and services. In this case，only government spending matters in affecting consumption 
and hence aggregate demand. In the extreme case，if government provided goods and 
services are perfect substitutes for their privately provided counterparts, aggregate 
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demand will not be affected by fiscal variables (Barro, 1990). Of course, the conclusion 
above depends on the assumption of same efficiency of public and private sectors. If 
public sector is less efficient，as widely believed, the conclusion will not be the same. In 
that case, depending on the nature of the change in government spending (whether it is 
permanent or temporary), aggregate demand will be affected. The insight from the 
New Classicals analysis is that the effect of fiscal policy is at best unclear, contrary to 
the belief of the New Keynesians. 
While the Keynesians stress the effect of government spending on the income 
identity, the New Classicals widen the scope to include the usefulness of government 
output. Although the New Classical analysis seems more reasonable, it is not the same 
to say that it is empirically better. In fact, the New Classical analysis is a composite 
hypothesis. To derived the conclusion of ineffective fiscal policy，perfect 
substitutability of government for privately provided goods and services and same 
efficiency of public and private sectors have to be assumed. Again, the substitutability 
and efficiency are not empirically observable. 
2.5 Conclusion for Part II 
The past three decades saw impressive theoretical innovations in 
macroeconomics. The view on the scope of government involvement in the 
macroeconomy has changed a lot as a result. The emergence of the New Classical 
school has challenged traditional Keynesian economics at theoretical level in many 
ways. As a result，the New Keynesians have come up in response. Many theoretical 
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problems are at issue, such as the role of government in macroeconomic management, 
the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies，etc.. The contentions of the New 
Classicals and New Keynesians inevitably leads to a blossoming of empirical tests 
reported in the literature. But unfortunately, the test results are far from conclusive. 
In Part m , the case of testing the Ricardian Equivalence will be examined. It is 
hoped that an in-depth study on the testing of a particular New Classical hypothesis 
will throw some light on the entire matter of empirical testing in economics and its 
relationship to a more fundamental problem of theory choice. 
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Part III Testing Ricardian Equivalence 
Interestingly, though the earliest version of Ricardian Equivalence was found in 
David Ricardo's writing, some authors documented that Ricardo himself later 
denounced its validity. The modem version of the Ricardian Equivalence is found in 
Barro (1974). In recent years, the huge accumulation of public debt in the U.S. has 
renewed economists' attention in this interesting hypothesis. 
If the Ricardian Equivalence holds (or approximately holds) in reality, many 
popular notions on the effect of government deficit will be false. On the theoretical 
level, the debate in the Ricardian Equivalence highlights the conflict between 
Keynesian theory and the New Classical theory, as popular notions on the effect of 
government deficit are usually derived from the Keynesian theory. The modem version 
of the Ricardian Equivalence is a theorem rigorously derived from a model in 
conformity with the New Classical paradigm (rational expectations, market clearing). 
Testing the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence posits a joint test of several theories 
from which the Ricardian Equivalence is derived, i®，u 
• 1 知 r ^ n n p n t income/life cycle hypothesis, term structure of interest rate, and efficient market 
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Equivalence or the Keynesian prediction. 
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3.7 Ricardian Equivalence versus Keynesian Theory 
In standard Keynesian model, a tax cut will increase people's disposable 
income. Holding budget deficit constant，higher disposable income will drive up 
aggregate demand, through an increase in consumption d e m a n d . ^^  How the tax cut is 
financed is not explicitly spelt out in this theory. Actually it can be either printing 
money or issuing government bonds or some combination of both. In the case of 
issuing bonds (which is the focus here)，for the Keynesian result to hold, it is implicitly 
assumed that people perceive government bonds as net wealth. In other words, it is the 
wealth effect of the newly issuing bonds that lead to an increase in aggregate demand. 
As a result, planned savings rise by less than enough to set off the tax cut. Total 
savings declined. As a result of a lower total savings, real interest rate rises to restore 
the equality of planned saving and planned investment demand. This means investment 
will decline as well. Public debt crowds out private investment. Capital stock will be 
smaller in the long run as a result, which means slower economic growth. In an open 
economy，the real interest rate will not rise. Rather the public debt will lead to capital 
inflow. Since interest rate is pegged to the world level, local currency will appreciate 
against other currencies, resulting in current account deficit” 
Whether government bonds are net wealth, then, is the key issue. Barro (1974) 
shows that government bonds is not net wealth for the economy as a whole. The 
intuition is very simple: if agents in the economy recognize that government budget 
12 This version of the Keynesian theory might be more accurately described as the "neoclassical synthesis". An 
example is the model in HaU and Taylor (1988). . ^^ ^ . � . . in the 80s seems to confonn with the prediction of the Keynesian theory. The nse 
二 c o n c e n t and strengthens the "KeynesianmentaW'on the role 
of government on the other. 
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deficit today means tax tomorrow, they will increase their savings equal to the present 
value of their future tax burden. The increase in savings will match the newly issued 
bonds exactly, rendering the interest rate unchanged (Barro, 1990). Then, government 
bonds are not net wealth, and there is no difference between financing by tax or 
financing by bonds. As a result, how to finance fiscal budget deficit is irrelevant. It is 
government spending that matters in affecting aggregate demand，rather than the 
debt/tax alternative in financing budget deficit. A debt-for-tax swap in financing budget 
deficit is irrelevant. ^ ^ 
The basic idea is that government also faces its budget constraint. Suppose the 
government is deciding how to finance a new budget deficit. All government spending 
have to be financed in some way，no matter it is by tax or bonds. Current bonds 
financed budget deficit will mean future tax with the same present value. This fact will 
be taken into consideration by the representative consumer in his optimization 
problem. In forward looking consumption theory, consumers are postulated to prefer a 
smooth instead of a fluctuating consumption path. To obtain the solution of 
consumption in current period, the (expected) future income stream, together with the 
consumer's current wealth position, will enter into the (consumer's) budget constraint. 
Since the present value of the newly issued bonds has the same present value of future 
tax (for repayment of the bonds)，its effect on consumer's budget constraint will be the 
same as current tax for financing the government budget deficit. In this case，the 
Keynesian crowding-out effect will not be observed. Since consumers notice that 
14 m Bairo's model, the effect of govennnental influence on aggregate demand s t : from 也 = = = = f 
gov^ent-providek and privately provided goods and services. In Keynesian model, the effect is the result of 
tax and transfer on disposable income. 
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current debt is future tax (with same present value), they will not spend the increase in 
their disposable income. Instead, they will increase their saving by exactly the same 
value as the newly issued bonds. As a result, the supply of the newly issued bonds is 
matched by increase in planned saving at the existing real interest rate. Then real 
interest rate will remain unchanged, and the Keynesian crowding-out effect will not 
happen. All the consequences as predicted in the Keynesian model will not be 
observed. 
3.2 (Unrealistic) Assumptions behind Ricardian Proposition 
3.21 Infinite Horizon, Altruism, and Intergeneration Transfer 
The Ricardian Equivalence is objected to on theoretical as well as on empirical 
grounds. On theoretical ground, it is criticized for several unrealistic assumptions. For 
one thing，derivation of the Ricardian Equivalence requires infinite planning horizon. 
That is the same to assume that people are immortal. If future tax only accrue to future 
generation, it seems obvious that no body will care. If future tax is expected after a 
person's death, the present value of the future tax will not enter into his (finite) 
planning horizon. A debt-for-tax swap will then have wealth effect. Budget deficit will 
be able to stimulate aggregate demand. Only the tax burden in a person's life time will 
likely be taken into account and enter into his planning horizon such that the Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem might hold” 
: 二 ？『二g and retired). lUe 富 generation, v^hen they retire, 二 meet 
= 二 〜 - g = = 滅 why this model is called o v e r — gen—ons modeL See 
Geanakoplos (1987) for exposition. 
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Barro justifies this apparent absurdity by appealing to Intergeneration transfer 
(Barro, 1990). As long as the older generation cares about their children, they will take 
into consideration of their future tax burden, hence leaving bequest to them. It was 
shown that, in an overlapping generations model with altruistic bequest，the Ricardian 
Equivalence holds (Barro, 1974; Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). Barro himself provides 
evidence that intergeneration in the broader sense (not just bequest) is significant 
(Barro, 1989). However, some authors argue that the evidence of Barro's and others 
are simply inconclusive (see Bernheim, 1987).^^ 
Besides, motivation of bequest will make a difference. What Barro has 
considered is altruistic bequest. Technically speaking, this means that the utility 
function of the older generation includes the level of utility of the younger generation 
as an argument. However, if the motivation of bequest is strategic rather than 
altruistic, the Ricardian Equivalence may not hold. Specifically，some authors model 
the bequest motive as a means for the parents to stimulate desired behavior on the part 
of their children. If that was the case, the Ricardian Equivalence will not hold under 
some specification (Bemheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985). On the other hand，with 
human capital investment (in form of education provided by parents，for example)， 
optimal response for the parents might be not leaving bequest at all (Feldstein, 1982). 
If parents expect their children to have higher productivity in the future, they might 
rather want to have transfers from their children, though this might not be possible. In 
that case, they will prefer to leave nothing for their children. But a debt financed 
J a ^ ^ e . always h . e (瓜 . e 
ofthe U.S.)，the problem�f finite horizon is worth mvesUgatmg. 
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government budget deficit provide them a way to leave their children a "negative 
bequest", if it is expected to be repaid after their death. In this case，government bond 
is net wealth. 
In fact, positive bequest might just indicate uncertainty of one's lifetime. 
Bequest might be an accident. Since lifetime is not certain, people will hold a positive 
amount of asset to prevent the situation that they survive but have run out of fund. In 
any case, uncertain lifetime implies that the present value of expected future tax burden 
is less that present value of debt. Then a debt-for-tax swap will have positive wealth 
effect. 
What if some families do not have children? In this case, for the childless 
families, a debt-for-tax swap will have wealth effect, if the future tax burden is beyond 
their lifetime. In effect, these persons are not connected to future generations at all. 
Some authors argue that the Ricardian Equivalence will not hold under this 
circumstances (Tobin and Buiter, 1980). However, proponents of the Ricardian 
Equivalence argue that the wealth effect is likely to be insignificant, unable to 
invalidate the Ricardian result (Barro, 1989). On the other hand，with some families 
without children, the future tax burden will be borne by the descendants of the families 
with children. If people are rational enough to take this into account，the Ricardian 
Equivalence will still hold. Obviously, the informational requirement for this result to 
hold is formidable. 
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In summary, altruistic bequest is essential for the Ricardian Equivalence to 
hold. Relaxing this assumption might not lead to the Ricardian result. On the other 
hand, it seems that infinite horizon is introduced for the sake of analytical convenience, 
instead of as a description of the real world (see, for example，Plosser, 1987). Seater 
(1993) suggests that "an accurate model of intertemporal planning has an infinite 
horizon，a positive probability of dying at each age，and a finite expected lifetime" 
(p. 147, original Italic). Obviously this will not be a tractable model. 
3.22 Imperfect Capital Market 
Efficient capital market is essential to obtain the Ricardian result. In a 
consumer's planning horizon, it is the loanable fund market which enables him to 
respond to the transitory fluctuation of income in order to arrive at a smooth 
consumption path. This is also important in deriving the Ricardian result. However, if 
the capital market is imperfect, depending on the reason of market failure，the 
Ricardian Equivalence may not hold. 
Suppose the government and the private sector face different borrowing rates， 
and the government faces a lower rate due to some reason. In this case, a debt-for-tax 
swap will have real effect. Since the private sector is unable to borrow at a favorable 
rate as the government does，a tax cut will mean to substitute borrowing. Similarly, 
suppose in the economy different people face different borrowing rates，i.e. some 
people are liquidity constrained, then，in this case，there will be real effect. Ricardian 
Equivalence will not hold. For the people who are liquidity constrained, a bond-
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financed tax cut will enable them to spend more today, which is not possible under the 
in the presence of capital market failure. 
But not all kinds of liquidity constraints will invalidate Ricardian Equivalence. 
It has been shown that, with liquidity constraint, the Ricardian equivalence may or may 
not hold，depending the cause of the constraint(Yotsuzuka, 1987). For instance, if 
liquidity constraint is due to adverse selection, the Ricardian Equivalence will not hold. 
It is because the compulsory nature of taxation helps solve the problem of adverse 
selection. 17 On the other hand, if liquidity constraint is due to uncertainty on future 
incomes, the Ricardian Equivalence will be preserved, as government issuance of 
bonds has no effect on the state of uncertainty. In summary, the effect of imperfect 
capital market on the validity of Ricardian Equivalence depends on the nature of the 
constraint which generates failure in the capital market. 
3.23 Distortionary Tax 
In Barro,s original paper (1974), tax is assumed to be lump-sum. But if tax is 
not lump-sum and is distortionary instead, debt-for-tax swap will have real effect 
because of the disincentive effect of the tax alternative. In reality，income tax is 
progressive and, hence, distortionary. Marginal tax rates rise as income gets higher. 
Since a debt-for-tax swap means deference of taxation, with distortionary taxation, 
current marginal tax rates will decrease. However, it will rise in the future in order to 
repay the debt. As intertemporal substitution effect sets in, aggregate demand in 
ITofco^se it is true only i f t ^ v e r m n e n t is more efficient in c o U e c ^ t ^ t h : the private lenders in 
c o l l ^ t ^ S M s means'that govennnent is able to bypass the problem of uncertamty. 
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current period will increase. Then, the Ricardian Equivalence will not hold because of 
distortionary taxation. 
3.24 Bounded Rationality, Perfect Foresight, and Rational Expectations 
Information requirement on the part of economic agents is very demanding for 
the Ricardian Equivalence to hold. In fact，one of the objections to the Ricardian 
Equivalence is the fact that economic agents are assumed either to have perfect 
foresight or rational expectations. Agents are either assumed to know their future 
income stream, or at least their expectations on future income streams are rational. 
While perfect foresight requires agents to know everything not yet happened, rational 
expectations require them to make only non-systematic error, which is no less 
restrictive than perfect foresight. Beyond analytic convenience, both of the 
assumptions are impossible in reality. 
Some authors cast doubt on the (tacit) assumption that agents are able to make 
the calculation purported in economic theory. Many laboratory evidence indicate that 
people simply cannot do so even in simplest cases (for example, see Thaler, 1992 and 
Heap et al, 1992). It should not be a surprise if people are unable to do the complex 
optimization problem. Then, it will be unreasonable to suppose that agents are able to 
calculate the result of，say, their permanent income. Given this impotence (actually a 
violation of rational expectations in strong form)，it is doubtful that the Ricardian 
Equivalence will hold in reality. Other objections include that agents fail to differentiate 
permanent and transitory income，fail to recognize current debt means fixture tax, etc.. 
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All these can be summarized as: agents simply do not have the kind of rationality 
portrayed in economic theory. This line of criticism is not specific to the Ricardian 
Equivalence. Instead, taking this criticism seriously would mean to cancel the whole 
enterprise of economic theories, which assumes fiill rationality of agents. 
On the other hand, the nature of economic generalizations like the Ricardian 
Equivalence is ambiguous. Are they similar to physical laws, the subject of which are 
not supposed to form "expectations"? It seems that economic generalizations are not 
the same as physical laws. An important component, agent's expectations, is always 
changing. Failure to find empirical regularity as depicted by theory might be the fault of 
"expectations” 18 
3.3 Empirical Evidence 
Theoretical discussions are not enough for a decision to accept or reject an 
apparently absurd theory. As long as a theory is internally consistent, it is always a 
virtue to turn to empirical evidence. Surprisingly, various authors, based on almost the 
same empirical results, can come up with totally different conclusions. For example, 
Bernheim claims that the evidence，on balance, does not support the Ricardian 
Equivalence (Bemheim, 1987). On the contrary, Barro, quoting almost the same 
studies, declares that the Ricardian Equivalence is sustained (see also Seater，1993)!i9 
一 一 ’ 一 - — 
mutually inconsistent results. 
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In Friedman's methodology, testing the realism of assumption is irrelevant in 
validating a theory. (In this case, the discussion above on the absurdity of the Ricardian 
Equivalence is in no way helpful.) Rather, one should test the prediction of a theory 
against empirical evidence. In fact，all theory，if taken literally, is necessarily false，in 
the sense that it is an incomplete description of the real world (Friedman, 1953).2o 
Then, empirical evidence will reign to make the judgment. While Friedman's view of 
theory choice is not to be disputed here，empirical evidence on the prediction of the 
Ricardian Equivalence will be briefly surveyed. 
3.31 Consumption Function Studies 
The Ricardian Equivalence can be derived from forward-looking consumption 
theory.2i In the context of consumers maximization of intertemporal utility, adding 
government expenditure and taxation to consumer's lifetime budget constraint will 
complete the theory. Forward-looking consumption theory, in the presence of 
government, predicts Ricardian results that the debt/tax mix has no effect on aggregate 
consumption. 
The evidence from consumption studies is mixed. Though some reviewers 
attribute this confusion to problems in econometric methodology (Bernheim, 1987; 
Seater, 1993), other authors simply disregard the results from consumption function 
20 Nagel (1963) objects to this conception oftheory. However, this issue is not to be disputed here. 
01 L . nf Picardian equivalence foUows directly from forward-looking consumption 
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studies as unreliable (Barro, 1989). To grasp the problem, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at some of the important econometric consumption function studies on the 
Ricardian Equivalence. 
Feldstein's paper (Feldstein, 1982) is one of the most widely cited paper in the 
literature of testing the Ricardian equivalence. In his model, consumption expenditure 
depends on disposable income, privately owned wealth, social security benefits, 
government spending, tax revenue, government transfer to individual and net debt of 
the government. Feldstein reports that the OLS estimates of the parameters in his 
model support the Ricardian Equivalence, except the coefficient of government 
transfer which obviously contradicts the Ricardian Equivalence. Then, an instrumental 
variable estimation method is used, noticing the problem of collinearity of tax revenue 
and consumption expenditure. One period lag value of tax revenue is used as 
instrument. In this case, he reports rejection of the Ricardian Equivalence: the 
coefficient of government expenditure is small and insignificant; the coefficient of tax 
variable is larger than the OLS estimate and imprecise; the coefficient of debt variable 
is too small，and there is strong effect of the level of government transfer. 
Seater and Mariano (1985) specify a model of consumption function according 
to Barro (1983[1990]). In estimating the equations，data on permanent income as well 
as permanent govemment spending are needed but not a v a i l a b l e . � � Proxies for them 
concetto c a p t j j r e 工 e 二 二 工 二poraiy change of independent variables. In 
二 二 S 二 ： 二 二 二 - and — c 一 e is — See Ba.o (1990) 
for exposition. 
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are to be found. Seater and Mariano apply the method developed by Beveridge and 
Nelson (1981) to arrive at proxies for the two permanent variables: permanent gross 
real income and permanent real government spending. 
The two-stage least square method is used and some new variables are added 
as instruments to correct simultaneous bias. Total consumption expenditure as well as 
expenditure on non-durables and services are used as measures of consumption 
expenditure. In both cases, estimates are jointly significant, except that, in the case 
when consumption expenditure is measured as spending on non-durables and services, 
its effect on permanent income is insignificant. And the coefficient on transitory income 
is also found to be significant, contradicting the prediction. Both results are 
contradictory to the prediction of the permanent income theory. One possible 
explanation is liquidity constraints. If consumers are liquidity constrained, their 
consumption demand will respond to transitory income. The Ricardian Equivalence 
will fail to hold in this case. 
Further tests are devised to check whether Ricardian Equivalence hold in the 
sample period. This is important because, if there is liquidity constraint, Ricardian 
Equivalence might fail to hold. If consumers perceive current debt as future tax, they 
will discount future tax in their budget constraint. By the two^stage least square 
method，the hypothesis of tax discounting is not rejected. In other words, the Ricardian 
Equivalence is not rejected in this specification and sample period. This seems to be an 
obvious contradiction: on the one hand, significant coefficient on transitory income is 
found; on the other, the Ricardian Equivalence is not rejected! Seater and Mariano 
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reconcile this by explaining that it is not the kind of liquidity constraint which will 
invalidate tax discounting. 
The approaches of Feldstein (1982) and Seater and Mariano (1985) are very 
different. While Feldstein adopts a more traditional Keynesian specification, Seater and 
Mariano adhere to the New Classical tradition. The major difference is that, while in 
the Keynesian view the effect of government activity affects consumption behavior 
through its effect on disposable income, for the New Classicals the effect on 
consumption is through the substitutability of government provided for privately 
provided goods and services. This means that for the New Classicals tax has no effect, 
as long as government output is perfect substitute for private output. In this light, 
testing the relative merit of both approaches will have important implications on the 
Keynesian-New Classical debate.^^ 
Kormendi's studies (Kormendi, 1983; Kormendi and Meguire，1986) are 
attempts to test both specifications at the same time.^ ^ His model specifies that private 
consumption expenditure depends on current and lagged income，government 
23 See ajso Seater (1993) for discussion on the effect of liquidity constraint. 
. 24 In other words, the Keynesian idea implies equality of the coefficients of income and tax variables in 
econometric model. Such constraint does not exist in New Classical specification. 
25 The specification of Kormendi's model different from that of both Feldstein's and Seater and l ^ a n a H e 
caU Ms -^consoHdated approach". He differentiates three kinds of govennnent spending. THe ^ is 
^ennnent consumption (GQ, which is the portion that yields utility to the pnvate sector 邸; 
L o n d is govennn^t investment (GL), which yields utility to pnvate sector m the fiitoe. TTie third is 
r v ^ L L ipa t ion (GA), ^vhidl coiresponds to the difference between the value created by government and 
^ e ^ ^ T d t r i S ^ e c l l W l govermnent spending is defined as the sum ofthesetoee comments. Smce 
1 T n ^ J n a Z l the economy's total disposable income is defined as YrGD,. Uns specification is v ^ 
O d ^二 = Z ignor^ substitutability of govennnent f^private — t i o n . ^ e 
^ ^ i r f i i r o f disposable income is: 广 肌 肌 - “ ~ 顶 ^^  
current govennnent transfer, and GINT is interest payment on outstanding public debt. 
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expenditure, wealth and government transfer. This specification of consumption is very 
similar to that in Seater and Mariano (1985). And at the same time，it is different to 
traditional specifications like Feldstein's, in that consumers base their decision on 
disposable income. Under his specification, government spending does not directly 
affect consumption demand. Rather, variables in the definition of disposable income 
play their part in consumption decision. 
Kormendi reports that the estimates of coefficients conform to the implication 
of the Ricardian Equivalence, except that the relatively large coefficient on transfer has 
to be explained. (Similar result is also found in Feldstein, 1982). To this end, Kormendi 
suggests that the magnitude reflects the fact that permanent transfer from "rich" to 
"poor" takes place in the economy. Since the marginal propensity to consume for the 
"rich" and the “poor，’ are different, with that ofthe "poor" being larger, transfer will 
have real effect in the aggregate. 
It is very often in econometric studies that some coefficients are consistent with 
prediction while other are not. This posted a difficult problem in accessing the 
econometric model on the one hand and in testing the economic theory behind on the 
other. It seems that there is no rational basis to deal with this problem. In some cases, 
it is the data to be blamed.^ ^ In other cases，ad hoc explanations are devised to explain 
" "TTTTZ^P of social security wealth used in Feldstein (1982) is simply incorrect 
2 : 二 = 二 二 = 二 口 一 一 皿 E — 
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away the problem.27 Thus, trying to draw any definite conclusion regarding the validity 
of the Ricardian Equivalence is not fruitful (except that the evidence is mixed). The 
grievance of Seater is surely applicable here: “.....macroeconometric evidence can 
verify anything (or nothing，depending on how you prefer to express yourself)." 
(Seater, 1993, pp.160) 
3.32 Interest Rate Studies 
Another line of study is the implication of the Ricardian Equivalence on the 
effect of government budget deficit on interest rate. According to the Keynesian 
theory, in a relatively closed economy, a tax cut accompanied by issuance of 
government bonds (with budget deficit remaining constant) will lead to an increase in 
aggregate demand. In other words，though the tax cut has caused an increase in 
desired private saving, but not enough to absorb all the newly issued government 
bonds. Thus, real interest rate has to rise. On the contrary, since the Ricardian 
Equivalence predicts no wealth effect of government bonds, real interest rate will not 
rise. That is, private saving will rise to match the increase in government bonds，such 
that the interest rate will remain constant. 
Unlike in consumption function studies, one cannot find any attempt like 
Kormendi's to compare the merits of different approaches. As a result, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to give a coherent picture of the results of interest rate 
Equivalence is not rejected, on ttie c^ m ,^ 二J which is not compatible to the Ricardian Equivalence, is 
二rS^UtytocoX^e.實磁e“poo广 
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studies. Instead of going into details of all the papers, two important works will be 
discussed. 
Barro (1987) studies the effect of temporary government spending. His study is 
important because it uses probably the longest series of interest rate of Britain 
(between 1701-1918). In the model in Barro (1990[1983])，interest rate serves the 
function as the price for intertemporal substitution, and only changes in temporary 
components of relevant variables are able to influence its level. It is postulated that, 
holding permanent government expenditure constant, change in temporary government 
expenditure will not have effect on real interest rate，as long as the change in budget 
does not have incentive effect. Change in budget in this manner will only constitute 
pure wealth effect. As a result, there will not be any intertemporal substitution effect， 
and the real interest rate will remain unchanged. Taking into consideration of the time 
series properties of this model，the estimate of the coefficient on temporary 
government expenditure is small, but significantly different from zero. 
There is a series of interest rate studies by Evans (1985，1987a, 1987b). He 
estimated an equation in which the nominal interest rate depends on government 
spending, the real money stock, and the real deficit. But the estimates contradict the 
conventional (Keynesian) theory; the coefficients on government spending and real 
deficit is not negative. 
Similar to the consumption function tests，interest rates studies do not offer 
much insight on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence either. It is very easy to 
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criticize the models being misspecified (especially the study of Barro, 1987). It seems 
that the debate is still on how to specify an econometric model，instead of the validity 
of any particular hypothesis. 
There are many other studies on the implication of the Ricardian Equivalence 
on exchange rates (e.g. Ahmed, 1986; Evans, 1986), national savings (e.g. Caroll and 
Summers, 1987)，current account deficit (e.g. Barro, 1993，quoting Evans), and 
international comparisons (e.g. Evans 1987b). As in previously mentioned studies, they 
all provide controversial results. In addition to theoretical problems，technical matters 
in econometric estimations are also involved. 
3.4 Technical Problems: (Unrealistic) Assumptions behind the 
Econometric Models 
After a review of econometric evidence, another one on the technical problems 
involved in econometric studies is followed. Beyond the problems noted in the above 
discussion, some more general problems are also to be considered in order to 
appreciate the limit of econometrics in testing of economic theories. 
3.41 Specification and Data Generation Process 
A misspecified model will produce biased estimators，which is not desirable for 
making statistical inference. Statistical inference is the way to test the reliability of 
certain hypothesis, given existing data. In most cases, as in the case of Ricardian 
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Equivalence, economic theory is not comprehensive enough to provide clear guideline 
to what variables are to be included. 
Even if we take the theory for granted, most models reviewed are subjected to 
specification error. The estimated equation in Evans (1985) is an example. The level of 
nominal interest rate may also depend on the expectations on inflation, unemployment 
rate，etc.. But there is no data available on expectations. The resulting OLS estimator 
will be biased. If the omitted variables correlated with the explanatory variable, the 
estimators will be inconsistent. Another example is in Barro (1987), which may suffer 
from simultaneous bias. Although there are tests for checking the specification, they 
are usually conducted in an oJ hoc manner. 
The transformation of an economic theory into an econometric model 
necessarily means assuming a specific data generation process. Consider the following 
regression model: 
Yt二 pXt+ i^t 
where Yt is the vector of observed value of the dependent variable, P is the vector 
parameter, Xt is the matrix of observed values of the independent variable, and is the 
vector of residuals. Specifically, the behavior of the data is governed by some 
underlying, unobservable structural parameter，P (e.g. marginal propensity to consume 
in the Keynesian consumption function, elasticities in demand functions, etc.)，given 
the values of independent variables. The fluctuation of the dependent variable is to be 
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explained by the interaction of the structural parameters and the independent variable, 
Xt. 
In OLS method, 1) the values of the independent variables are assumed to be 
nonstochastic, 2) data points of different observations are linearly independent; 3) the 
error term has zero mean and 4) has common finite variance, and 5) the value of the 
error term of different observations is not correlated. Given these assumptions on the 
data generation process, OLS method will yield estimators which are unbiased and 
have minimum variance. This means that，by following the OLS rules of estimation in 
repeated sampling, the OLS estimators will yield estimates which, on average, will 
equal the true parameters (i.e. unbiasedness). Also, by applying the OLS estimators, 
the estimates (in repeated sampling) will be of minimum variance. (Of course, the 
estimates will vary across samples.) That is the basic consideration. Other techniques, 
such as time series techniques and simultaneous equations systems, are for 
accommodating an assumed data generation process in order to get the (say) unbiased 
and consistent estimator by OLS technique. And diagnostic tests are available for 
checking whether the assumed data generation process is consistent with the behavior 
of the data. 
In some ofthe models reviewed, single equation estimation is used，rather than 
simultaneous equation technique implied by economic theory. Macroeconomic theory 
indicates which variable is exogenous and which is endogenous. However, this is not 
followed in many cases (e.g. Feldstein, 1982; Barro, 1987; Evens，1986，1987b). It is 
very likely that the models in these studies are misspecified. 
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Almost all the steps in the procedures to obtain estimates, from data selection 
to diagnostic testing, are ad hoc. After all，it is very difficult, if not impossible, to know 
the real data generation process. That is why the data are "modeled" to specific 
generation process. And the "model" of data generation process might change across 
samples. In most cases, if the estimates are perverse, usually the econometric model or 
the quality of data and proxy are blamed. On the other hand, in most cases a number of 
models of different specifications are estimated using different techniques. Then, 
usually, the model which best fit the data is selected. However, this procedure strongly 
decrease the value of econometric studies in testing. After all, in order to support to a 
particular hypothesis, "inferior" model will not be reported. 
In this light, the relationship between economic theory and econometric 
practice is quite ambiguous. The view that econometrics as the tool for testing 
economic theory may be wrong. Before there is a consensus on the solutions of these 
technical problems, macroeconomic debates will continue. But note that "consensus" is 
not equal to "solution". Consensus may be just an illusion of truth. 
3.42 Identification Problem 
Due to the limit imposed by the non-experimental nature of the data, sometimes 
the causal relationship among variables cannot be identified. Thus it is not easy to 
interpret the estimates properly. In consumption function studies，it is almost 
impossible to explain the significant coefficient of government transfer on any 
theoretical ground. Except Feldstein (1982), all authors justify this with ad hoc 
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explanations, like difference in marginal propensity to consume of different income 
groups. Another explanation is that deficits and savings have strong cyclical 
movement, rendering it difficult to differentiate the pattern of causation (Barro, 1989; 
Seater, 1993). On one side, it is the problem of identification. On the other side, it is ad 
hoc explanation to save a particular grouping of hypotheses. At best，it can be said that 
the evidence is inconclusiveThe real cause of the behavior of the coefficient is thus 
not identified. 
3.43 Staggering of (not-well-established) Hypothesis 
In applied science, predictions are derived on the basis of some well established 
laws as the major premises (Hayek, 1967). For instance, in geology，predictions on a 
particular class of events are based on physical laws. And these laws are assumed to be 
true, although the problem of induction is to be noted. 
Similarly, when testing the Ricardian Equivalence, some other hypotheses are 
asserted. For instance, in consumption function studies，the permanent income/life-
cycle theory is assumed to be true. In the interest rate studies, the efficient market 
hypothesis and the term structure theory of interest rates are asserted. Based on these 
hypotheses, the implications of the Ricardian proposition are derived. This staggering 
of hypotheses makes it almost impossible to test any single hypothesis. Even worse，it 
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is even questionable to believe that the additional hypotheses stated above are well 
established. 
3.44 Proxies for Unobservables 
In some specifications，proxies for unobservables are needed. Both Seater and 
Mariano (1985) and Barro (1987) need data on permanent government spending, 
which are not observable. The technique of Beveridge and Nelson (1981) is used to 
construct a series of it. Roughly speaking, ARIMA model is estimated for the series of 
government spending. The prediction of the model is treated as the permanent 
component, and the difference between the actual and the predicted value is treated as 
the transitory component. 
The problem is that permanent/transitory income (or government spending) are 
aU theoretical concepts, probably with no empirical bearing. What they mean in the 
context of consumption theory is that the expectation on the duration of the impact of 
any change in decision variables will have different effect on consumption decision. 
Suppose there is an unexpected increase in income. If the consumer expects this to be 
temporary (i.e. income rises only for a short period and then returns to the original 
level)，the marginal propensity to consume out of the increased amount will be less 
than one. On the other hand, if income is expected to remain at the new level, the 
marginal propensity to consume will be close to one. 
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Since expectations are "subjective data" (Hayek, 1952), the impossibility to 
obtain them will be fatal for macroeconometrics. Expectations play a vital role in 
economic theory. It is the basis of all human action. But it is doubtful the proxy for 
expectations (like permanent income and expectations on the value of other variables) 
can really approximate people's expectations. As it is highly probable that people's 
expectations on, say, interest rate, will be different, the "typical individual" approach 
which assumes people have the same information set and arrive at same expectation 
may not work. 
3.5 Conclusion for Part III 
The material in this section is a bit scattered and tedious. It is only a sample of 
researches that have been done. A point can nevertheless be made: econometrics is far 
from the perfect tool for testing economic theory. Rather, it is a combination of 
statistical theory and economic theory, constituting a distinct enterprise. Economic 
theory and econometric model have a subtle linkage. It is econometrics which is 
supposed to provide rigorous testing procedures. Econometric models cannot be 
specified without economic theory. Begiiming from economic theory, we arrive at an 
econometric model at the final stage of empirical testing, based toher on a bunch of 
assumptions on the nature of underlying data generation process as well as 
appropriateness of the proxies. 
If empirical evidence contradicts the prediction of economic theory plus 
econometric model，it will be difficult to know which assumptions are to be changed. 
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From this perspective, modus tollens may cease to be a useful step in justifying 
economic theory. It is always easy to blame the tools instead of the underlying theory 
for inconsistent results. In this light, it is perfectly understandable why Lawrence 
Summers makes this complaint: “.....much of macroeconomic theory is excessively 
divorced from empirical observation and that as a consequence it is taken more 
seriously than it deserves to be. In large part this is the result of the failure of empirical 
work to deliver facts in a form where they can be apprehended by theory" (Summers, 
1993, p. 144). 
As Mary Morgan put it: ”.....econometricians have been primarily concerned 
with finding satisfactory empirical models, not with trying to prove fundamental 
theories true or untrue" (Morgan, 1993, p. 199). From this perspective, econometrics is 
not to be considered as the engine for testing economic predictions. Prediction as the 
caveat of theory choice has nothing got to do with econometrics. 
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Part IV Conclusion 
The previous parts of this thesis point out the problems of testing economic 
theory by comparing its predictions to empirical evidence. Emphasis is put on 
econometric testing, which is supposed to be an important tool for testing in 
economics. Two problems, which render testing of economic theory impossible 
emerge: the composite nature of hypotheses and the lacking of data on expectations. 
The first one is actually addressed in philosophy, and called the 'T)uhem-Quine" thesis. 
The second problem has in fact been realized for quite some time by the Austrian 
economists, but is nevertheless forgotten now. The Austrian economists has brought 
economists attention to the subjective nature of economics. Recognizing the nature of 
expectations and its importance in determining economic behavior, the Austrians are 
doubtful on the plausibility of testing economic theory by means of comparing the 
prediction with empirical evidence. 
4.1 Duhem-Quine Thesis 
“An Experiment in Physics Can Never Condemn an Isolated Hypothesis but 
Only a Whole Theoretical Group" wrote Duhem (quoted in Gillies,1993, p.98). As 
examined in Part m , a test of the Ricardian Equivalence cannot be considered as a test 
on the proposition in isolation. It is too involved; it is permanent income hypothesis 
plus rational expectations plus efficient market hypothesis and so on constitute the 
object of the test. If the test result is not consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence，it 
is the "whole theoretical group" which is to be blamed. 
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For instance, in consumption fiinction studies, a whole bunch of auxiliary 
assumptions are made for the test to be feasible:^^ 
1) permanent income / life cycle hypothesis is true; 
2) specification of econometric model is correct; 
3) the underlying data generation process is as assumed in the particular econometric 
model; 
4) the data is in correspondence with the theoretical construct. 
Interest rate studies also suffer from similar difficulties. In deriving the Ricardian 
result, further assumptions have to be made: a specific term structure theory of interest 
rate, together with the efficient market hypothesis. The evidence from these tests are 
mixed and hard to interpret. It is just not clear that whether the specific theory fails, the 
efficient market hypothesis fails, or the Ricardian Equivalence fails (or all of them fail). 
In terms of the covering-law model of explanation in part I, this means that the 
explanans sentence, aside from the Ricardian Equivalence itself, includes in fact the 
above auxiliary assumptions. Then, by modus tollens, any test result which is 
inconsistent with the prediction of the Ricardian Equivalence would mean to reject the 
whole of the explanan sentence，instead of the Ricardian Equivalence alone. Along 
with the Ricardian Equivalence, there is a bunch of hypotheses on the validity of the 
auxiliary assumptions (e.g. validity of the permanent income hypothesis，and of the 
specific version of the term structure theory) and the “goodness，，of the proxies of 
Ricardian Equivalence, as discussed in Part m. 
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unobservables. Rejecting the Ricardian Equivalence might not mean that the Ricardian 
Equivalence is alone at fault. Instead，it is the whole bunch of hypotheses being 
rejected. In economics, this problem is especially important, because most explanations 
consist of many hypotheses, which may not be well established. 
According to Hayek (1962)，to account for a particular class of phenomena, 
many hypotheses are involved. These hypotheses, in many cases, are structured in 
hierarchical order. This is particularly so in the applied sciences. For example, physical 
laws are utilized in the study of geology. In deriving any specific geological hypothesis, 
these physical laws are assumed to be true. Similarly, the permanent income/life cycle 
hypothesis and the efficient market hypothesis are assumed to be true in deriving the 
Ricardian result. Although there are many tests on these hypotheses, they are no less 
fragile than tests on the Ricardian Equivalence. Relying on them to derive any test will 
not improve the power ofthe test. 
4.2 The Austrians and Subjectivism 
The Austrian economists are famous for their adherence to subjectivism. 
Combining it with apriorism, the older generation Austrians arrive at an extreme 
conclusion: it is not necessary to test economic theories. They believe that，since the 
axioms from which economic theories are derived are synthetic a priori, the 
conclusions (i.e. e c o n o m i c theories) are also necessarily true. Mises，an important 
figure ofthe first generation Austrians, once wrote that, “.....econometrics is a childish 
game.’，The influence ofthe philosophy of Kant is apparent in this extreme position. 
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Younger generation Austrians may not share this position on apriorism. But their 
emphasis on subjectivism is no less than the older generation Austrians. Hayek points 
out that most of the data in economics consist of subjective data, including the way 
people see their environment and what they expect to happen in the future (Hayek, 
1952; 1967). Since these data are neither accessible nor quantifiable, treating economic 
theory as physical laws is inappropriate. Put it simply, the procedure of testing theories 
in physics is inapplicable in economics (recall the discussion on econometrics). 
According to Hayek, the unavailability of data together with the complexity^o 
of economic phenomena reduced the quality of explanation and prediction of economic 
theories. Only imprecise explanation (and prediction) can be obtained from economics. 
In this sense, testing economic theories is still possible. But it is highly probable that 
mutually incompatible theories accounting for the same phenomenon will coexist (as in 
macroeconomics todayV! Although this view is not without disputes, the message is 
quite clear. Testing theory by comparing predictions with empirical evidence is not 
appropriate. In macroeconomic models with rational expectations，it is assumed that 
agents form rational expectations and use the same economic model as that of the 
economists. But, intuitively, it is just not possible. On the other hand, people's 
expectations (i.e. what they expect to happen in fiiture) and the ”model” they use (i.e. 
the way they decipher the environment) are the basic data for economics. In principle， 
they are to be measured instead of assumed. However, since they are in practice not 
accessible，the plausibility of testing economic theory is greatly reduced. 
to，_J"act many vanables are mvolved in them. And it is 
wiU exactly happen. See Hayek (1967). 
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4.3 Hausman 
Daniel Hausman's methodological position is quite close to that of John Stuart 
Mill. As economics deals with a small number of well known laws excluding a large 
number of related factors and the laws are only conditional (by virtue of ceteris 
paribus), it is very improbable that they be disconfirmed. Any disconfirming instances 
can be explained away by relaxing the ceteris paribus assumption. Thus, testing 
economic theory is not really an important business. 
This is in sharp contrast to Popperian methodological prescription: the ad hoc 
explanation is a immunizing strategy, rendering economic theory unfalsifiable. 
Similarly, the role of econometric studies is trivialized, because it is all too easy to 
blame the econometric tools or the data or both. Since economic theory only 
articulates a limited set of laws，econometric model derived from economic theory is， 
in the word of Hausman, inexact (Hausman, 1992b). Talking about verification or 
falsification of economic theory by means of econometric study is meaningless. While 
the Austrians stress the subjective aspect of economic theory. Mill and Hausman stress 
its incompleteness. Regardless of the apparent difference，the implication of their 
methodological position has the same meaning to the role of prediction. After all, 
economic theory is impossible to test. Then the role of prediction is diminished. 
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4-4 Friedman and Popper Revisited 
The methodological position of Friedman and Popper is different in many 
respects. But on the role of prediction and testing of economic theory, they are more 
or less the same. For Friedman, comparing prediction to empirical evidence is of prime 
importance in validating a theory and theory choice. Similarly so for Popper. First of 
all, a theory should be falsifiable. Then the more time it stands the empirical tests，the 
better it is. 
However, according to the Duhem-Quine thesis, it is very difficult to isolate 
any particular hypothesis in the procedure of testing. The main hypothesis, together 
with the auxiliary assumptions, are always an inseparable whole. This is a serious 
difficulty. If it is not possible to identify which hypothesis is important in arriving at the 
test results, it will be impossible to eliminate the “bad” theories. On the other hand，the 
inseparability of hypotheses provide a very good immunizing strategy for preventing a 
theory from being falsified. The discussion on the testing of the Ricardian Equivalence 
provides us good example on this kind of immunizing stratagem. If the econometric 
evidence is contradictory to the Ricardian results, it can be the data which are to be 
blamed (e.g. the mismeasurement of social security wealth in Feldstein, 1982), or the 
tools which are to be blamed (e.g. many consumption functions studies are accused of 
suffering from simultaneous bias), or both. Proponents of the Ricardian Equivalence 
save their hypothesis in this way. 
Austrian subjectivism cast another difficulty. As the data on expectations does 
not exist, testing economic theories should not be the primary task. In principle，theory 
58 
on formation of expectations should be developed first as the foundation of economic 
theories. And this may be the job of cognitive scientists. However，even if we have this 
type of theory, another piece of puzzle is still needed: what information people have. 
But this seems even more difficult to get than to develop theory on the formation of 
expectations. In our case study of the Ricardian Equivalence, these problems are 
tackled by two classes of assumptions: the first class is on the formation of 
expectations; the second is on the information set people have. Both the New 
Classicals and the New Keynesian make extensive usage of rational expectations. 
Aside from analytical convenience, the assumption of rational expectations does not 
offer much insight on the process of expectation formation. It is simply assumed as 
such. The foundation of these theories are weakened without knowledge on formation 
of expectations. In empirical studies, more specific expectation formation process, like 
distributed lags of relevant variables, are used. But it is doubtful that all the people use 
the same process in forming expectations. 
What information people have is crucial to the formation of expectations. In 
econometric studies on the Ricardian Equivalence, economic agents are assumed to 
have specific information set. For example, they are assumed to extract information on 
the past value of a limited set of variables. And it is obvious that the set is far from 
complete. On the other hand, other sources of information are available but not easily 
quantifiable. The announcement of the monetary authority on future monetary policy， 
obviously, is crucial in expectation formation. But knowledge of this kind is not readily 
quantifiable. 
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In some models (e.g. in Barro, 1990)，how people perceive the change in policy 
variable is crucial to the final outcome. Whether a change in government spending is 
regard as transitory or permanent will have very different implication. But data of this 
distinction is not accessible. Strictly speaking, permanent and transitory component of 
a variable is theoretical, probably not empirical. Proxies are then devised for these 
unobservables. Since it is highly probable that different individual will have different 
perceptions on the nature of the change in policy variables, the proxies for transitory 
and permanent variables，which presuppose people have the same perception, might 
not be appropriate. The foundation of the econometric tests based on this kind of 
proxies is very weak. 
In this light, the position of Hausman can be easily put in its place. Given the 
technical as well as methodological problems, economic theory can be easily justified in 
an ad hoc manner. That is why it is commonplace that disputes always evolve around 
whether the assumptions are appropriate, instead of on the test results. All these 
problems imply that the methodological prescription of either Friedman and Popper is 
not possible to put into practice. Before reaching the stage to decide the validity of 
economic theory, a lot of disputes have to be resolved first. The discussion on the 
technical problems of econometric studies has already revealed the limit of this 
important tool. And the discussion of this part focus on methodological problems. 
Both kinds are closely related. With these problems, the prevailing methodological 
prescription in economics leaves much to be desired, and theory choice based on 
prediction rest on extremely shaky ground. 
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4.5 The Role of Prediction 
This thesis is set out to study what economists preach about the role of 
prediction, what they actually do about prediction in their empirical work, and the 
difficulties in doing what they preach. Friedman's methodology is what economists 
preach, in that prediction has an eminent role in theory choice. However, in practice it 
is much more complicated than it first appears. There are not only technical difficulties, 
but methodologically more fundamental issues are involved. However, it seems that 
economists doing empirical studies are not very much concerned with the basic rules of 
logic. Usually too bold a claim is made on the validity of a particular hypothesis 
regardless of its limitations, while similar claims are made for alternative hypothesis. 
This attitude may well reflect the difficulties involved in hypothesis testing in 
economics. Inasmuch as conflicting hypothesis all claim validity based on empirical 
results, prediction ceases to be able to play the eminent role in theory choice ascribed 
to it. No wonder that the so-called evidence are no more than one of the rhetorical 
devices in the eyes of McCloskey (McCloskey, 1983; 1985). The function of such 
rhetorical devices are just for persuasion. Whether scientific knowledge can be gained 
through the use of them is in doubt. For the time being at least, what different schools 
in economics believe is largely based on “faith” 
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Epilogue 
Ricardian Equivalence Vs Approximate Equivalence: Some Reflections 
What is the purpose of using an "ideal case" in scientific inquiry? Part of the 
answer for this question is illustrated in our search for the validity of the Ricardian 
Equivalence. It is widely believed that the use of an ideal case does not mean the world 
is exactly working that way. Rather, empirical investigation is aimed at discovering 
discrepancy from it, and then look for explanation for the discrepancy. From this 
perspective, in the case of the Ricardian Equivalence, to search for strict equivalence 
makes no sense. Rather, the important question is whether Ricardian Equivalence is a 
close approximation of reality (Seater, 1993; Plosser, 1987). 
While Plosser (1987) raised the MiUer-ModigUani theorem as an example, 
another classic in economics, I believe, is the Coase theorem (Coase, I960). It states 
that，assuming zero transaction cost and well defined property right, the initial 
distribution of property right is irrelevant to allocation of resources. Many authors 
criticize Coase theorem for making unreaHstic assumption, trivializing its value in 
economic inquiry. However, as stated in Coase (1988)，he is in no way interested in 
such a world in which the Coase theorem holds strictly. Instead, the “Coasean world’， 
should be the benchmark for. investigation. It is any departure from Coase theorem that 
needs to be explained，instead of the Coase t h e o誰 itself (Posner，1993). 
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Another issue relates to the policy debates between New Keynesian and New 
Classicals. Since the Ricardian Equivalence is associated with the tenet of New 
Classical, it will be interesting to see, if Ricardian equivalence does not hold, whether 
the alternative view is sustained. It might well be possible that both views are wrong. 
Barro (1989) suggests that, although some evidence does not support the Ricardian 
view, they do not support the New Keynesian view either. In this context, the relevant 
questions in the controversy on the validity of the Ricardian Equivalence become: 1) is 
Ricardian equivalence supported by evidence? 2) if not，is the alternative view 
supported? 
In this case，asking for strict equivalence in the real world is irrelevant. Rather， 
it is more important to know which alternative provides a better approximation to the 
reality. A further step will be to provide explanation of the observed departure from 
the ideal case, i.e. Ricardian Equivalence. However, this more pragmatic attitude 
towards science stiU faces another problem: how close should Ricardian Equivalence 
be close to reality before we accept it as "good approximation"? This is no less 
troubling. On the surface, it seems to be a problem of measurement (and, perhaps， 
convention on the standard of acceptability). But a closer look will reveal that it is far 
more profound. 
Truth and Invariance 
Consider Kepler's laws of planetary motion and Newtonian mechanics. 
Restricted to the domain of predicting the behavior of celestial objects, which one is 
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superior in doing the job? If we adopt the standard of the 17th century, the 
achievements of both are indeed undifferentiated. But now Kepler's laws are 
considered as the special case, a derivative of Newtonian mechanics. Obviously, the 
success of Newtonian mechanics, to a very large extent, has to do with its "general-
ness". Varieties of diverse phenomena are explained and successfully predicted by the 
same mental apparatus. In other words, it can be said that Newtonian mechanics is 
relatively invariant than Kepler's laws.�� 
In the case of Ricardian Equivalence，economists should not be satisfied with 
approximate results. Rather, they should put their effort in search of more 
fundamental, invariant relationship, as in the example of last paragraph. If one is，like 
me, more "Austrian" inclined, he will see the basic problem lies in the way people see 
the environment and what they see will take place in the future. In other words，it is 
expectations. Put it another way, "pure logic of choice" is merely a tool (Buchanan, 
1979)，in that without an "interpretation", it has no empirical content? Thus，the 
nature, formation, and evolution of expectations are more fundamental than the "pure 
logic of choice"，which form the backbone of economic theories.^^ 
aspect of decision making process is very important 
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- y 
Certitude, Simplicity, and Irrationality 
Making sense out of the world of chaos is probably an instinct of human 
beings. The desire for certitude and simplicity is no less intense than the desire for any 
other things else. "Science" is in fact the enterprise which its ultimate goal is to search 
for certitude and simplicity. The development of physics in the past three centuries is 
not just one of the greatest triumph of modem science. It also shapes our perception of 
society. People tend to believe that human society is like a clockwork, that there is 
incorrigible truth underneath its operations, and, by pursuing proper "method"，we can 
ultimately reach the Truth. 
It is not easy to appraise this influence. But one thing is quite clear, that it is 
too demanding on our capacity to know. To avoid further philosophical disputes, let's 
first admit the capacity of our sense perception. At least we have to admit that our 
perceptual system provide us with most of the data about the environment. But that's 
all. Aside from flux of phenomena, we probably are not able to know more with 
certitude, not to say the "incorrigible Truth" portrayed by modem science. As a fact of 
existence, we have to admit that we are ignorant about the world around u s ” Even 
though there might be Truth as such, perhaps we can never reach it. 
The desire for certitude and simplicity，probably，is derived from our longing 
for a sense of security. If the world around you is incomprehensible, probably you 
T ： „ ；m…rt抓t fimire in contemporary existentialist movement, called this as "philosophical 
IS^S：： ^ M y l of Sisy一 - CMer Essays, New York: Vintage 
International.. 
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won't feel secure. Calling the desire for security "irrational" might be going too far. But 
if it is replaced by the illusion of Truth, it is perhaps equally irrational. 
66 
References 
Abel, Andrew B. (1987) '^Ricardian Equivalence Theorem" in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate 
& P. Newman (ed.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol.4, 174-79. 
London: Macmillan. 
Ahmed, Shaghil (1987) "Government Spending, the Balance of Trade and the Terms 
of Trade in British History" in Journal of Monetary Economcics. 20. 
Altson, Richard M” J.R. Kearl and Michael B. Vaughan (1992) "Is There a 
Consensus Among Economists in the 1980V, in American Economic Review: AEA 
Papers and Proceedings, vol 82 no.2. 
Aschauer, David Alan (1988) 'The Equilibrium Approach to Fiscal Policy" in 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.20, no.l. 
Ball, Laurence and N. Gregory Mankiw (1994) “A Sticky-Price Manifesto” NEBR 
Working Paper Series, no.4677. 
Balzer, Wolfgang and Bert Hamminga (eds)(1989) Philosophy of Economics. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publiser. 
Barro, Robert J. (1974) "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?" reprinted m Money, 
Expectations, and Business Cycles, New York: Academic Press. 1981. 
(1987) “Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices, and Budget Deficits in 
the United Kingdom, 1701-1918" in Journal of Monetary Economics. 20. 
(1989) "The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits" m Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol.3 no.2. 
(1990) Macroeconomics. 3rd ed. New York: Jone Wiley & Sons. 
Barth, James R., George Iden，and Frank S. Russek (1986) "Government 
Goverlnnent Spending, and Private Sector Behavior: Comment” m Amencan 
Economic Review, vol.76, no.5. 
Bemheim, B. Douglas (1987) "Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and 
Evidence" in NBER Macroeconomics Annual MA: MIT Press. 
Bemheim, B. Douglas, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers (1985) "The 
Strategic Bequest Motive" in Journal of Political Economy, vol.93. 
and John B. Shoven (ed.)(1991) National Saving and Economic 
Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
67 
Beveridge, Stephen and Charles R- Nelson (1981) “A New Approach to 
Decomposition of Economic Time Series into Permanent and Transitory components 
with Particular Attention to Measurement of the 'Business Cycle,” in Journal of 
Monetary Economics. 7. 
Blanchard, Olivier and Stanley Fischer (1989) Lectures on Macroeconomics. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Blaug, Mark (1980) The Methodology of Economics: Or How Economists Explain. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
(1992) The Methodology of Economics: Or How Economists Explain. 2nd 
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Blinder, Alan S. (1989a) "Keynes After Lucas" in Macroeconomics Under Debate. 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
(1989b) "Keynes，Lucas, and Scientific Progress" m Macroeconomics Under 
Debate. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
(1989c) "A Skeptical Note on the New Econometrics" in Macroeconomics 
Under Debate. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Boland, L.A. (1979) "A Critique of Friedman's critics" in Journal of Economic 
Literature, 17，reprinted in Caldwell (1984). 
Boskin, Michael J” John S. Flemming and Stefano Gorini (ed.)(1987) Private 
Saving and Public Debt New York: Basil Blackwell. 
Buchanan, James M. (1979) What Should Economists Do? Indianapolis: Liberty 
Press. 
Buchanan, James M and Richard E. Wagner (1977) Democracy in Deficit New 
York: Academic Press. 
BuUard, James (1990) "Rethinking Rational Expectations" in George M. von 
Furstenberg (ed.) Acting under Uncertainty: MulUdisciplinary Concepts. Boston, MA: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
(1991) "Learning, Rational Expectations and Policy: A Summary of Recent 
Research" in Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review 73(1). 
Caldwell, Bruce J. (ed.) (1984) Appraisal and Criticism in Economics. Boston: Men 
& Unwin. 
(1991) "Clarifying Popper" in Journal of Economic Literature. vol.XXK 
(Mar. 1991). 
68 
(ed.)(1993) The Philosophy and Methodology of Economics, vol. I-EI. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Caldwell, Bruce J. and A.W. Coats (1984) "The Rhetoric of Economists: A 
Comment on McCloskey" in Journal of Economic Literature vol.XXII June 1984. 
Camus, Albert (1955) The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Carlstrom, Charles T. and Edward N. Gamber (1989) "Why We Don't Know 
Whether Money Causes Output" in Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland. 
Carroll, Chris and Lawrence Summers (1987) ‘Wht Have Private Savings Rates in 
the United States and Canada Diverged?" m Journal of Monetary Economics. 20. 
Cebula, Richard J. (1993) "An Empirical Analysis of Federal Budget Deficits and 
Interst Rates Directly Affecting Savings and Loans" in Southern Economic Journal 
vol.60, no.l. 
Christ，Carl F. (1987) "Government Budget Restraint" in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. 
Newman (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol.2, 554-56. London: 
Macmillan. 
Christensen, Michael and Martin Paldam (1991) "Shooting Fish in the Barrel? 
Examining the Standard Test of the Lucas Variability hypothesis" m Applied 
Economics. 1991.23..0 
Clower，Robert W. (1994) ''Economics as an Inductive Science" in Southern 
Economic Journal 60(4), April, 1994. 
Coase，Ronald H. (1960) "The Problem of Social Cost" reprinted in Coase (1988). 
(1988) The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Colander, David C. and Robert S. Guthrie (1981) "Great Expectations. What the 
o S n s D o "Rational Expectations" Mean?" in Journal of Post Keynesian Econormcs. 
Winter 1980-81 vol.m no.2. 
Cross Rod (1982) ‘The Duhem-Quine Thesis，Lakatos and the Appraisal of Theories 
in Macroeconomics" reprinted in Caldwell (ed.)(1984). 
Darnell，Adrian C. and J. Lynne Evans (1990) The Limits of Econometrics. Hants: 
Edward Elgar. 
Dharmapala, D. (1993) "On the History and Methodology of Econometrics" in 
Journal of Economic Surveys. vol.T.no.l. 
69 
De Long, J. Bradford and Kevin Lang (1992) "Are All Economic Hypotheses 
False?" in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100.no.6. 
De Marchi, Neil (1988) The Popperian Legacy in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Eichner, Alfred S. (1983) Why Economics is not yet a Science? London: Macmillan. 
Elster, Jon (1989) Nuts and Bolts. Cambridge: Camgridge University Press. 
Evans, Paul (1985) 'T>o Large Deficits Produce High Interest Rates?" in American 
Economic Review, vol.75, no.l. 
(1986) “Is the Dollar High Because of Large Budget Deficits?’，in Journal of 
Monetary Economics. 18. 
(1987a) "Interest Rates and Expected Future Budget Deficits in the United 
States’，in Journal of Political Economy, vol.95, no. 1. 
(1987b) 'T)o Budget Deficits Raise Nominal Interest Rates? Evidence from 
Six Countries" in Journal of Monetary Economics. 20. 
Feldstein, Martin (1982) "Government Deficits and Aggregate Demand" in Journal 
of Monetary Economics. 9(1982). 
Feyerabend, Paul {19SS) Against Method revised ed. London: Verso. 
( 1 9 9 1 ) Three Dialogues on Knowledge, London: Basil Blackwell. 
Feynman, Richard P. (1965) The Character of Physical Law. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Flavin, Marjories (1987) "Comment" on Beraheim (1987). NBER Macroeconomic 
Annual 1987. NBER. 
Frazer, William J. and Lawrence A. Boland (1983) "An Essay 
of Friedman's Methodology" in Journal of Economic Literature, vol.73 (Mar. 1983). 
Frey Bruno S. and Reiner Eichenberger (1993) "American and European 
Economics and Economists" in Journal ofEconomic Perspective, vol 7 no.4. 
I Z d Z l Milton (1953) "Tlie Methodology of Positive Economics" m Essays ！n 
Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Geanakoplos, John ( 1 9 8 7 ) "Overlapping Generations Model of General EquiHbrium" 
= 二 二gate, and Newman (eds)77.. Ne. Palgrce. London: Macmdlan. 
Gordon Robert J. (1990) "What is New Keynesian Economics?" in Journal of 
Economic Literature. vol.XXVn (Sept. 1990). 
70 
Granger, C.W.J” and P. Newbold (1974) "Spurious Regressions in Econometrics" 
in Journal of Econometrics, vol.2. 
Greene, William H. (1993) Econometirc Analysis. New York: Macmillan. 
Griffiths, Williams, R. Carter Hill，and George Judge (1993) Learning and 
Practicing Econmetrics. New York: John Wiley and Sonc. 
HaU, Robert E. and John B. Taylor (1988) Macroeconomics. 2nd ed. New York: 
Norton. 
Hands, Douglas W. (1985) '"Karl Popper and Economic Methodology" in Philosophy 
and Economics, 1, 83-99. 
Hausman, Daniel M. (1992a) Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
(1992b) The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hayek, F.A. (1952) The Counter-Revolution of Science. Indianapolis: Liberty Press. 
(1967) Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Heap, Shaun Hargreaves, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden and 
Albert Weale (1992) The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide. Oxford: BlackwelL 
Hempel, Carl G. (1966) Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall. 
HiUier，Brian (1991) The Macroeconomic Debate. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil BlackwelL 
floover，Kevin D. (1988) The New Classical Macroeconomics: A Skeptical Inquiry. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
( 1 9 9 3 ) "Econometrics as Observation: The Lucas Critique and the Nature of 
Econometric Inference" University of California, Davis. 
Hospers, John (1956) "What is Explanation?" reprinted in Klemke et. al. (1980). 
Hutchison, Terence (1960) The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic 
Theory, Ch.l, 2, and 5. reprinted in Caldwell (1984). 
Johnston，J. (1984) Econometric Methods. (3rd ed.) London: McGraw-Hill. 
T r^nr^e R. Carter Hill，William E. Griffiths, Helmet Lutkepohl, and 
T=，g_= IntrocLnon to tke THeory an, PracUce of EconmeMcs^ 
(2nd ed.) New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
71 
Kantor, Brian (1979) "Rational Expectations and Economic Thought" in Joiiranl of 
Economic Literature. vol.XVU. 
Keane, Michael P. and David E. Runkle (1989) "Are Economic Forecasts 
Rational?" in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Spring 1989. 
Kirzner, Israel M. (1987) "Austrian School of Economics" in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate 
& P. Newman (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol.1, 145-51. 
London: Macmillan. 
Klamer, Arjo (1984) The New Classical Macroeconomics: Conversations with New 
Classical Economists and their Opponents. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. 
Klemke, E.D., Robert Hollinger and A. David Kline (1980； Introductory Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. 
Knight, Frank H. (1940) "'What is Truth' in Economics?" reprinted in Caldwell 
(1993). 
Kormendi, Roger C. (1983) "Government Debt，Government Spending, and Private 
Sector Behavior" m American Economic Review, vol.73, no.5. 
Kormendi, Roger C. and Philip Meguire (1986) "Government Debt，Government 
Spending, and Private Sector Behavior: Reply" in American Economic Review, vol.73， 
no.5. 
(1990) "Government Debt, Government Spending, and Private Sector 
Behavior: Reply and Update" in American Economic Review, vol.80, no.3. 
Kreps，David M. (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory. New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward Presort (1977) "Rules Rather than ；Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans" in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85 no.3. 
(1990) "Business cycles: Real Facts and a Monetary Myth" in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Spring 1990. 
Learner, Edward E. (1983) ‘ le t ' s Take the Con out of Econmetrics" m American of 
Economic Review. voL73, no. 1. 
L e i j o n h u f V u d , Axel (1993) 'Towards a Not-Too-Rational Macroeconomics" in 
Southern Economic Journal vol.60, no.l. 
Leimer，Dean R and Selig D. Lesnoy (1982) “Social Security^d Private Saving: 
New Tkne-Series Evidence” m Journal of Political Economy, vol.90, no.3. 
Lucas, Robert E.，J r . (1973) "Some Mema^onal E ^ d e n c e on Output-Inflation 
Tradeoff- reprinted in Studies in Business-Cycle Theory. MIT. 1981. 
72 
(1976) "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" reprinted in Studies in 
Business-Cycle Theory. MIT, 1981. 
Maddala, G.S. (1992) Introduction to Econometrics, (2nd ed.) New York: 
Macmillan. 
Maddock, Rodney and Michael Carter (1982) "A Child's Guide to Rational 
Expectations" in Journal of Economic Literature. vol.XX. 
Magee，Bryan (1973) Popper. London: Fontana Press. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory (1988) "Recent Developments in Macroeconomics: A Very 
Quick Refresher Course" in Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. vol:20 no.3. 
(1990) "A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics" in Journal of 
Economic Literature. vol.XXVIII. 
(1992) "The Reincarnation of Keynsian Economics" in European Economic 
Review 36 (1992). 
Manuelli, Radolfo E. (1986) "Modem Business Cycle Analysis: A Guide to Prescott 
Summers Debate" in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Fall 
1986. 
Mason, Will E. (1981) "Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman's Positive Economics" 
in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. Winter 1980-81, vol.m no.2. 
Mayer，Thomas (1993) "Friedman's Methodology of Positive Economics: A Soft 
Reading" in Economic Inquiry voLXXXI no.2. 
Mayo, Deborah (1981) "Testing Statistical Testing" in Pitt (ed)(1981). 
McCallum, Bennett T. (1988) "Postwar Developments in Business Cycle Theory: A 
Moderately Classical Perspective" in Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. voL20 
no.3-
(1990) "New Classical Macroeconomics: A Sympathetic Account" in Seppo 
Honkapohja (ed.) The State of Macroeconomics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
McCloskey, Donald N. (1983) "The Rhetoric of Economics" in Journal ofEconomic 
Literature vol. XXI, June 1983. 
(1985) The Rhetoric of Economics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
( 1 9 9 3 ) “The Limits of Expertise: If You're so Smart, Why Ain't You Rich?” 
in Caldwell (ed.) (1993). 
(1994) Knowledge and Persuaion in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
73 
Miller, David (ed.) (1985) Popper Selection. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Minford, Patrick and David Peel (1983) Rational Expectations and New 
Macroeconomics. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 
Mises, Ludwig von (1949) Human Action: A Treatise of Economic Science. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
(1978) The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method 
(2nd ed.) Kansas City: Sheed Andrew. 
Modigliani, Franco and Arlie Sterling (1986) "Government Debt，Government 
Spending and Private Sector Behavior: Comment' in American Economic Review. 
vol.76, no.5. 
Morgan, Mary (1993) 'Tinding a Satisfatory Empirical Model" in de March! (ed.) 
(1988). 
Nagel, Ernest (1963) "Assumptions in Economic Theory" reprinted in Caldwell (ed.) 
(1984). 
Nelson, Charles R , and Charles 1. Plosser (1982) Trends and Random Walks in 
Macroeconomic Time Series" in Journal ofMonetay Economics. 10. 
Paldam, Martin (1993) "Towards Anarchy in Macroeconomics: A Wild Review 
Essay" 'm European Journal of Political Economy. 9(1993). 
Phelps，Edmund (1988) "Comment" on Mankiw (1988) in Journal of Money，Credit’ 
and Banking, vol.20.no.3. 
Pindyck, Robert S” and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1991) Econometric Models and 
Economic Forecast (3rd ed.) New York: McGraw-Hill 
Pitt，J.C. (ed)(1981) Philosophy of Economics. Dordrecht: D. Riedel Publishing. 
Plosser, Charles I. (1987a) "Comment" on Bemheim (1987). NBER Macroeconomic 
Annual 1987. NBER. 
(1987b) ‘Tiscal Policy and the Term Structure" in Journal of Monetary 
Economics. 20. 
(1989) "Understanding Real Business Cycles" in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol.3 .no.3. 
Popper, Karl R. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge. 
Posner，Richard A. (1993) "Nobel Laureate: Ronald Coase and Methodology" in 
Journal ofEconomic Perspective, vol.7, no.4. 
74 
Prescott, Edward C. (1986a) "Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement" in 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Fall 1986. 
(1986b) "Response to Skeptic" in Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review. Fall 1986. 
Redman, Deborah A. (1993) Economics and the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Reichenbach, Hans (1951) The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Rosenberg, Alexander (1989) "Are Generic Predictions Enough?" in Blazer and 
Hamminga (eds)(1989). 
Rudner, Richard S•，(1966), Philosophy of Social Science in Beardsley, Elizabeth 
and Monroe (ed.). Foundation of Philosophy Series. Prentice-Hall. 
Russell, Steven (1992) 'TFnderstanding the Term Structure of Interst Rates: The Term 
Structure Theory" in Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. louis. 
July/August 1992. 
Sargent, Thomas J. and Neil Wallace (1975) '"Rational' Expectations, the Optimal 
Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule" in Journal of Political 
Economy vol.83 no.2. 
Savin, N.E. and Charles H. Whitehead (1987) Xucas Critique" in The New 
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and 
Peter Newman. London: Macmillan. 
Scarth，WiUiam M. (1988) Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Advanced Methods. 
Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
Seater, John J.(1993) "Ricardian Equivalence" in Journal of Economic Literature 
voLXXXI. 
Seater, John J. and Roberto S. Mariano (1985) ‘New Tests oftheLife Cycle and 
Tax Discounting Hypotheses" in Journal of Monetary Economics. 15(1985). 
Sim，Christopher A. (1972) 'Money, Income，and Causality” in American Economic 
Review. 62. 
Snell, Andy (1989) "Information, Rational Expectations and Macroeconomic 
Modeling" in Journal of Economic Surveys vol.3 no.2. 
Stein，Herbert (1988) "Comment" on Mankiw (1988) in Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking. vol.20.no.3. 
75 
(1991) "The Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics" in Scand. J. of 
Economics 93(2). 
Taylor, John B. (1980) "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contacts" in Journal of 
Political Economy. Feb. 1980 88(1). 
Thaler, Richard H. (1992) The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of 
Economic Life. New York: Free Press. 
Tobin，James and W. Buiter (1980) 'Tiscal and Monetary Policies, capital 
accumulation, and Economic Activity" in George M. von Furstenberg (ed) The 
Government and Capital Formation. Cambridge: Ballinger. 
Varian, Hal R. (1992) Microeconomic Analysis. New York: Norton. 
Yotsuzuka, Toshiki (1987) ‘TRicardian Equivalence in the Presence of Capital Market 











,  V  ^ 
J  - ‘  > 
..
V
 L  •  
•-
 -
i  ,  >  f  .
丄
 .  I:  •II..
...mr_
_i 
g^^ggfisaa^aa^ i^aaaaa^saagfwwMMi 丨丨丨_丨丨丨丨•••••• 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
圓__111111 
• ••EMTBEt, 
